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This paper analyzes two-way interactions between structural reform and macro policy. If
structural reforms increase the flexibility of labor markets, they are likely to improve the short-run
inflation-unemployment tradeoff, providing an incentive for policymakers to expand aggregate
demand. In turn, the promise by policymakers that they will encourage a decline in unemployment
in response to good news on inflation can be used to strike a political deal with political interests
opposed to the introduction or extension of structural reform. Expansionary monetary policy also
provides relief on the fiscal front, directly by bringing the actual budget deficit closer to the
structural budget deficit, and indirectly, by encouraging structural reform, potentially reducing the
structural budget deficit itself.
In 1992-93 several European countries dropped out of the ERM to pursue more expansionary
monetary policies. The difference in the performance of these countties and those countries which
maintained a peg between their currencies and the Deutsche mark provides an important test case
of the consequences of expansionary monetary policy. The depreciating nations by 1995 enjoyed
a substantial relative acceleration of nominal GDP and, surprisingly, an even greater deceleration
of inflation, so that their growth rate of real GDP accelerated more than their growth rate of nominal
GDP in relation to the pegging countries. The continued deceleration of inflation in the depreciating
countries provides evidence that their natural unemployment rate has declined and that expansionary







Perhaps the most important single economic issue in Europe today can be
linked to the topic of this paper, macroeconomic policy and structural maladjustment.
Is it possible for Europe to pursue the macroeconomic policies needed to achieve
monetary union despite the existence of structural maladjustments, such as excessive
fiscal debt and deficits, underfunded state pension and welfare programs, state
subsidies of inefficient firms, and overregulated product and labor markets? What
are the connections and feedbacks between macro policy and structural reform? Do
these connections suggest any new avenues for policy in countries like France that are
currently struggling to resolve the conflicts among fiscal stringency required on the
route to monetary union, monetary tightness required to maintain a fixed exchange
rate, and the political strife with interest groups resisting structural reform ?
The paper begins by examining data on major aspects of macroeconomic
performance in Europe and the United States. It then turns to a theoretical section
that interprets the interactions between macro policy and structural maladjustment
in terms of aggregate demand and supply analysis. In this view, the task of macro
policy is to control the growth rate of nominal aggregate demand, while structural
maladjustment can be viewed as an adverse supply shock, and successful structural
reform as a beneficial supply shock. We shall analyze the similarities and differences
between the effects of structural maladjustment and adverse supply shocks, such as
oil price shocks.Macroeconomic Policy, Page 2
The supply shock model forces us to distinguish between the level and rate of
change of structural maladjustment. Structural reform may be viewed as analogous
to a negative change in the degree of structural maladju~ment. On closer
examination some types of structural reform are just as likely to reduce the rate of
productivity growth as to raise it. The analysis of demand and supply shocks forces
us to distinguish as well between two leading models of aggregate supply — the
natural rate hypothesis and the hysteresis model —and a hybrid that combines them.
How does the outcome of alternative policy interventions depend on knowing the
right model in advance?
The next section of the paper examines feedback from reform to macro policy:
countries with more flexible markets may have a more favorable short-term inflation-
unemployment tradeoff. This is particularly important from the perspective of the
hysteresis hypothesis, which implies that a reduction in unemployment may be
achieved at the cost of only a finite increase in the inflation rate, the amount of
which depends on the slope of the short-run tradeoff curve. There is also feedback
from macro policy to reform: a policy that leans in the direction of expansion may
make it possible to create a political deal with interest groups that resist reform. An
expansionary policy also reduces the impact of transition costs from reform.
Most of our discussion of macro policy revolves around monetary policy and
exchange rate policy. There is still the need to determine where fiscal policy fits in.Macroeconomic Policy, Page 3
Is there still a role for fiscal policy in managing
the monetary-fiscal mix states that monetary
demand; fiscal policy mainly influences the real
long-run capital accumulation and growth.
aggregate demand? The theory of
policy mainly controls aggregate
interest
Should monetary policy be conducted differently in
rate and hence the rate of
nations that have relatively
high ratios of public debt to GDP? When fiscal deficits exceed the level consistent
with a stable debt-GDP ratio, the need to run a budget surplus becomes an imperative
and requires a stimulative monetary policy to compensate, with the implication that
exchange rate stability may not be consistent with fiscal convergence.
The empirical section of the paper examines data on the experience of selected
European countries since the 1992 breakdown of ERM, which provides a controlled
experiment of the consequences of expansionary aggregate demand policy. We
examine the behavior of nominal GDP growth, as well as the “split” of nominal GDP
growth between inflation and real GDP growth, in those countries that experienced
major effective exchange rate depreciations in 1992-93 as compared with some of
those that did not depreciate. We conclude by developing the implications of the
empirical results for future macro policy within Europe and exploring the desirability
of a continued push toward monetary union.Macroeconomic Policy, Page 4
2. The Primary Puzzles in Macroeconomic Behavior
2.1 Inflation, Unemployment, and Labor’s Share
We begin by comparing basic macroeconomic indicators for Europe and the
United States, in order to identify the puzzles to be explained. Figure 1 displays the
well-known divergence in the time series of unemployment rates in Europe and the
United States. In 1995 the unemployment rate for the current members of the
European Union (labelled “Europe” in Figure 1) was 11.0 percent, compared to
roughly 2 percent for the same countries in the early 1960s, The 1995
unemployment rate in the United States was 5.7 percent, exactly the same as in 1963.
The upsurge of European unemployment relative to U. S. unemployment occurred
primarily between 1975 and 1985, suggesting that the search for an explanation
should begin with major structural changes that occurred within Europe during that
decade.
The major theories that describe the interrelation between the unemployment
and inflation rates are the natural rate hypothesis and the hysteresis hypothesis.
Inflation rates for the Unit~~d States and the same set of European countries are
displayed in Figure 2. Here we see that the average inflation behavior of “Europe”
has been remarkably similar to that of the United States since the late 1960s, with the
European inflation rate exceeding that for the United States by one or two percentage
points per year in most years. Given the similarity of the inflation performances, theMacroeconomic Policy, Page 5
natural rate hypothesis is consistent with the data only if the natural rate of
unemployment was roughly stationary in the United States over the last three decades
but increased by roughly as much as the actual unemployment rate in Europe over
the same period. This leaves the causes of the increase in the European natural
unemployment rate unexplained.
During the early 1980s a popular explanation for the divergence of European
and U. S. unemployment rates was a contrast in labor-market behavior. The seminal
work of Branson-Rotemberg (1980), Sachs (1979), and Bruno-Sachs (1985),
emphasized the contrast between real wage rigidity in Europe and real wage
flexibility in the U. S. Following the early- 1970s slowdown of productivity growth
shared in common by all industrialized nations, real wage flexibility in the U, S.
allowed the growth of real wages to decelerate in tandem with productivity growth,
while real wage rigidity in Europe prevented such a deceleration.
It is easy to assess the validity of this hypothesis by examining data on labor’s
share in national income. By definition, labor’s income share (S) is equal to the real
wage ~/P) divided by output per hour (Q/H). Using lower-case letters for logs, this
definition implies that the growth rate of the real wage is equal to the growth rate
of productivity plus the growth rate of labor’s share:
Aw-Ap = (Aq-ti) + As (1)Macroeconomic Policy, Page 6
Thus any tendency of the growth rate of real wages (Azu- Ap) to exceed the growth
rate of productivity (Aq - Ab) would be reflected in positive growth in labor’s share
(~). In consequence, the real-wage rigidity hypothesis leads us to expect that labor’s
share in Europe would have increased relative to that in the United States during
1975-85, the period of the rising relative European unemployment rate. As the cost
of labor increased relative to its marginal product, profits would have been squeezed,
the demand for labor would have decreased, and unemployment would have
increased.
The real-wage rigidity hypothesis regarding Europe has as its counterpart a
substantial U, S. literature on the failure of real wages to grow over the past two
decades, despite a positive (albeit small) growth rate of output per hour. In the
American view, structural features of U. S. labor markets account for the failure of
real wages to keep pace with productivity. According to equation (l), this common
perception implies that the U. S. wage share must have declined substantially. For
zero real wage growth to have been consistent with a 1.0 percent annual rate of
productivity growth, labor’s share should have declined at 1.0 percent per year, for
instance from 70 percent in 1973 to 53 percent in 1993.
Both the real-wage rigidity hypothesis for Europe as well as the common U. S.
perception of stagnant real \/ages appear to be the reverse of the truth, as shown by
the display of wage shares ir~Figure 3. These wage share series, constructed by theMacroeconomic Policy, Page 7
OECD, include in wage income an imputation for the labor income earned by the
self-employed. Far from declining rapidly, the wage share series for North America
(dominated by the U. S. ) has remained roughly constant, falling only from 68
percent in 1973 to 66.5 percent in 1993. The wage share series for Europe did
increase relative to North America during 1974-81, which coincides with the period
when the European unemployment rate began its relentless descent. But since 1981
the European wage share has declined much more, from a 1981 value of 69.3 percent
to 63.4 percent in 1993.
Thus any effect on unemployment of the high European wage share during the
late 1970s should have been more than reversed by the declining wage share during
the 1980s and early 1990s. The absence of such a reversal in the natural
unemployment rate casts doubt on the original rigid-real-wage hypothesis as a
convincing cause of persistently high European unemployment. The difficulty in this
explanation is parallel to that in linking the worldwide post-1973 productivity
slowdown in the industrialized countries to the oil price shocks of the 1970s, since
the oil shocks have now been completely reversed in real terms, while the
productivity slowdown has not been reversed in most countries.
Competing with the view that the increased natural rate of unemployment was
structural in origin is the hysteresis hypothesis, which postulates that the natural rate
is “state dependent,” automatically following in the path of the-actual unemploymentMacroeconomic Policy, Page 8
rate like the tail of a dog.1 The hysteresis hypothesis can explain the evolution of
actual unemployment in Europe by a combination of events that raised the actual
unemployment rate, especially adverse supply shocks (e.g., higher oil prices and a
temporary increase in labor’s share) accompanied by restrictive demand policy. In
turn, through hysteresis the natural rate followed in the path of the actual
unemployment rate, Because the actual unemployment rate was above the natural
rate during the transition process, the inflation rate declined, as shown in Figure 2.




beneficial supply shocks supported by
actual unemployment rate below the
natural rate, i.e., the unemployment gap must become negative, in order to “drag
down” the natural rate.
As we shall see in Fig~re 4, none of the major European countries is close to
having a negative unemplc yment gap. The consequence of such hypothetical
expansionary policies would be to raise the inflation rate until the economy stabilizes
at a new equilibrium with a lower actual and natural unemployment rate, and a more
rapid rate of inflation. A key issue in evaluating the merits of expansionary policy
is to determine the tradeoff between inflation and unemployment in the transition to
the new equilibrium. The divergent experiences of those countries that dropped out
of the ERM in 1992-93 highlight the recent behavior of the tradeoff.
1. See the recent book edit(;d by Cro~ (1995a), especially his own my (Cro~ 1995 b).Macroeconomic Policy, Page 9
2.2 Unemployment Gaps, Structural Deficits, and the Stabilizing Deficit Ratio
Studies are available for many different countries which provide estimates of
the natural rate of unemployment, and of the gap between the actual and natural
rates of unemployment. 1995 unemployment gaps for the G-7 countries, plus Spain
and Sweden, are shown in Figure 4. The source is Giorno et. al. (1995), which uses
a method developed by Elmeskov and MacFarlan (1993). The natural rate of
unemployment is estimated by solving an equation in which the rate of change of
wages is related simply to the unemployment gap; thus the natural unemployment
rate is equal to the actual unemployment rate in any year in which wages are neither
accelerating nor decelerating. The unemployment gaps in Figure 4 are arrayed
between the United States, which in 1995 had a negative unemployment gap and was
assessed to be producing act~al real GDP in excess of potential real GDP, and at the
other extreme France and
percent. The average gap
the actual unemployment
Spain, with estimated unemployment gaps in excess of 3
for Europe is about 2 percent, and subtracting this from
rate of 11 percent (Figure 1) implies that the natural
unemployment rate for Europe in 1995 was about 9 percent, much higher than the
estimate of 6 percent for the United States.*
2. In Gordon (1995a) I ha~~erecently estimated the U. S. natural rate of unemployment as a time-
varying parameter and have found it co have decreased gradually from about 6.4 percent in 1981 to about 5.8
percent in 1995.Macroeconomic Policy, Page 10
Using a version of Okun’s law to translate unemployment gaps into gaps
between actual and potential output, Giorno et. al. (1995) also compute structural
budget deficits, i.e., the budget deficit that would be incurred if the economy was
operating at potential output instead of at actual output. Figure 5 displays the 1995
estimates for the same set of countries covered by Figure 4 and shows that most of
the fiscal problems of the high-deficit European countries are structural rather than
recession-induced. None of the European countries have actual deficits that are more
than double their structural deficits. Of course, if the natural rate of unemployment
were lower in these countries, the structural deficits would be correspondingly lower.
This provides a link between the hysteresis hypothesis and the fiscal dilemma facing
Europe. There is the possibility that monetary expansion could pull down both the
actual and natural rates of unemployment, and thus reduce the structural deficits
without politically difficult budget-cutting. But this would require exchange rate
depreciation, the acceptance of additional inflation, and the abandonment of
monetary union.
The consequence of large fiscal deficits is, of course, an increase in the ratio
of government debt to GDP. Currently for the major European countries this ratio
ranges from 52 percent for France to 125 percent for Italy, as shown in Figure 6.
A standard relation states that stability of the debt-GDP ratio requires that the deficit-
GDP ratio be equal to the growth rate of nominal GDP times the debt-GDP ratio.Macroeconomic Policy, Page 11
Table 1 compares the actual and structural deficits for the same countries included
in Figure 6 with a computed “stability value” of the deficit-GDP ratio. The stability
ratio is the current debt-GDP ratio from Figure 6, multiplied by the “warranted
growth rate of nominal GDP, which in turn is set equal to the rate of potential
output growth plus the current rate of inflation,3 As shown in the first column of
Table 1, for the U. S., in which nominal GDP growth of 5.0 percent is consistent
with steady inflation and steady output growth at the potential rate, the required
deficit-GDP ratio is 2.3 percent (.46 times .05 equals .023), a bit above the 1995
actual deficit and exactly equal to the 1995 structural deficit. Hence the figure
displayed on line 5 for the U. S. is -0.5, indicating that the actual deficit is smaller
than the stability value, implying a slight shrinkage in 1995 of the debt/GDP ratio,
while the figure displayed c~n line 7 is 0.0, indicating that the structural deficit is
exactly equal to the stability value.
Table 1 includes simil:~r calculations for the other European countries covered
by Figures 4-6. Line 5 shows that all but Germany and Italy have actual deficits well
in excess of the stability value, implying continued growth in the debt-GDP ratio.
The surprising inclusion of Italy in the stability group results from a combination of
a huge debt/GDP ratio and relatively rapid inflation (and hence high warranted
3. For countries with positive unemployment gaps in Figure 4, the natural rate hypothesis predicts
that inflation is demlerating. Thus the warranted nominal GDP growth rate allows the rate of real GDP
growrh to accelerate ~ti -u with the deceleration of inflation until the unemployment gap is eliminated.Macroeconomic Policy, Page 12
nominal GDP growth). The list of countries with structural deficits in excess of the
stability value on line 7 is the same as the list of countries with positive gaps on line
5, although of course the debt/GDP ratio would grow more slowly if these countries
adopted expansionary policies to eliminate their output and unemployment gaps.
2.3 Exchange Rates, Demand Growth, and Inflation
The macroeconomic policy discussion within Europe over the past few years
has been dominated by the Maastricht conditions for monetary union, and the debate
over the significance of the breakdown of the ERM in 1992. Figure 7 plots the
effective exchange rates of the four largest European countries from 1981 to 1995.
The history has three stages: convergence from 1981 to 1987, the ERM period from
1987 to 1992, and then the breakdown period starting in 1992.
Subsequently we will return to the recent period and ask how the post-1992
divergence of exchange rates influenced nominal GDP growth and the split of
nominal GDP growth between real GDP growth and inflation. A preview for the
four largest countries is provided in Figures 8 and 9. Many different factors
influence nominal GDP growth, and we can focus on several major episodes. The
major events that occurred after 1987 were the British boom of 1987-89, the German
reunification boom of 1990-91, and the divergence of British nominal demand
growth from the French rate after 1992. Italy presents a puzzle, with the appearanceMacroeconomic Policy, Page 13
of convergence of nominal GDP growth closer to the French rate rather than
divergence after the 1992 Italian exchange rate depreciation.
Further puzzles are evident in the behavior of inflation rates in Figure 9,
French and German inflation rates were relatively close together after 1987, except
for the period of the German reunification and its aftermath, 1991-93. The puzzle
is that British and Italian inflation rates were much closer to the French and German
inflation rates after 1992 than before. We shall return to this puzzle, and its
implications for demand management policy, in section V of the paper.
3. Stwctuml Maladjustment and Aggregate Demand-Supply Analysis
This section links the two main topics of the paper, macro policy and structural
maladjustment, to several simple analytical tools and theories. These include the
distinction between demand and supply shocks, the natural rate hypothesis, the
hysteresis hypothesis, and the response of demand-management policy to supply
shocks.
3.1 Demand Shocks and the Natural Rate Hypothesis
We begin with the familiar expectational Phillips curve diagram in Figure 10,
which plots the inflation rate against the unemployment rate. If the natural rate
hypothesis is valid, the long-run Phillips curve (LP) is a vertical line rising above the
natural unemployment rate (U*). The initial short-run Phillips curve (SPJ is drawnMacroeconomic Policy, Page 14
on the assumption that the expected inflation rate is p’. which in turn is equal to the
actual inflation rate (p~, the point in the vertical dimension at which the SP curve
intersects the vertical LP line. The SPcume shifts whenever there is a change in the
expected inflation rate (p’). The SP curve can also shift upward in the case of an
adverse supply shock, and down in the case of a beneficial supply shock. We will
shortly link the concept of structural maladjustment to that of supply shocks.
The influence of aggregate demand is shown by the DG [for Detnarui Growth)
schedule. The position of the DG schedule is determined by the excess of the rate
of nominal GDP growth over potential output growth, or “excess nominal GDP
growth” (x), as well as the previous period’s unemployment rate. When x is equal
to the inflation rate, then by definition actual output gro~h is equal to potential
output growth, and the unemployment rate is fixed. When x exceeds the inflation
rate, then actual output growth exceeds potential output growth, and the
unemployment rate declines.4
Consider the effect of a permanent acceleration of excess nominal GDP growth
from XOto xl. The DG line shifts upward as shown, and the economy initially moves
to point El. With adaptive expectations and an adjustment coefficient of unity, the
4. When this analysis is done on a diagram with the output gap on the horizontal axis then the DC
=hedule is a negative 45 degree line. If the Okun’s law coefficient linking the unemployment gap to the
output gap were unity, then the DC schedule in Figure 10 would be a positive 45 degree line. If the Okun’s
law coefficient is 2 (an output gap of 2 corresponds to an unemployment gap of 1), then the slope of the DC
line is 2, indicating that a shortfall of inflation below x of one percentage point corresponds to an
unemployment gap of minus 0.5.Macroeconomic Policy, Page 15
expected inflation rate is equal to last period’s actual inflation rate. Hence in the
subsequent period the SP line shifts upward to cross the LP line at a point (marked
C) directly to the right of point El. In the subsequent period the DG schedule shifts
to intersect the long-run rate of inflation directly above the initial equilibrium point
(at the point marked A).5 If the rate of excess nominal GDP growth is maintained
at xl permanently, the economy will go through the loop shown by the dashed spiral
line.
This diagram summarizes the basic results implied by
hypothesis. A permanent acceleration of excess nominal GDP
the natural rate
growth causes a
permanent acceleration of inflation of the same amount after a transition period in
which the inflation rate oscillates above and below its long-run equilibrium value.
Maintaining an unemployment rate (UJ below the natural unemployment rate (U*)
requires a steady acceleration of excess nominal GDP growth and results in a steady
acceleration of the inflation rate. The process is symmetric if the short-run Phillips
curve is linear, as shown in Figure 10. A deceleration of inflation requires a
permanent deceleration of excess nominal GDP growth, results in oscillating inflation,
and a temporary period of unemployment above the natural rate.
5. Imagine a DGZ line drawn through point A. This indicates that the unemployment rate would be
unchanged if the inflation rate at that point (pJ equal led the value of excess nominal GDP growth (xl) at the
same point.Macroeconomic Policy, Page 16
3.2 Supply Shocks and t~ Interpretation of Structural Maladjustment
Figure 11 uses the same model to examine the effects of an adverse supply
shock. The shock is viewed as shifting the SP schedule upwards without changing its
slope. If the shock is an agricultural crop failure, the relative price of farm products
will temporarily increase, and the initial SPOschedule will shift upward to SP’. But
after the cause of the agricultural problem is over and normal conditions return, the
relative price of farm products will decline. The economy will temporarily enjoy a
beneficial supply shock due to the relative price decline, and the SP curve will shift
down to SF’ during the transition period back to normal prices. The OPEC oil
shocks of 1974-75 and 1979-81 raised the relative price of oil for a substantial
period. In this case the upward shift of the SP curve to SPYis followed by a return
to the initial position (SPJ when the transition to the higher relative price is
complete, ignoring the impact of shifting inflation expectations.
A central case useful for the analysis of supply shocks is a situation in which
excess nominal GDP growth remains unchanged at XO,and so for the initial transition
period the DG schedule remains fixed. Then with an adverse supply shock the
economy would go initially to point L, with higher inflation and higher
unemployment. Even if in tile subsequent period the supply shock goes away, the SP
schedule will stay above its initial position if expectations are formed as we assumed
previously in Figure 10, reflecting the response of expected inflation to the higherMacroeconomic Policy, Page 17
actual inflation caused by the supply shock. Gradually higher unemployment will
push down the inflation rate, and the economy will slide back to the initial position
by the route shown by the dashed line.
But policymakers will be tempted to fight the unemployment caused by the
supply shock. If they accelerate nominal demand growth sufficiently, i.e., pursue a
policy of “accommodating” the supply shock, the economy will avoid an increase in
unemployment but at the cost of a permanent increase in inflation. The economy
will arrive at a point like N, with both actual and expected inflation equal to the
permanently higher rate of excess nominal GDP growth. The shift from a point like
EOto a point like N provides a realistic description of the process by which the U. S.
made a transition from 5 percent inflation in the early 1970s to 10 percent inflation
in the late 1970s.
The opposite extreme is a policy of “extinguishing” the supply shock. Nominal
GDP growth is dropped sufficiently to push the economy rightward to a point like
M. Because inflation does not accelerate, there is no adjustment of expectations.
Eventually, when the initial transition is completed (i.e., the relative price of oil
settles down to its new higher level), the SP curve will shift back to its initial position.
However, excess nominal GDP growth has been diminished, and if this reduction is
maintained, there will be a permanent reduction in the rate of inflation in the
subsequent transition. In short the policymakers face a tradeoff in reacting to supplyMacroeconomic Policy, Page 18
shocks, with a neutral (point L) or extinguishing (point M) policy implying a
temporary increase in unemployment, but an accommodating policy (point ~
implying a permanent increase of inflation. The contrast between the effects of
accommodating and extinguishing policies helps to explain why Germany did not
experience an increase in its inflation rate in the late 1970s, whereas the U. S. and
several other European countries did experience an acceleration of inflation that
persisted until the major monetary restriction of the early 1980s began.
Numerous events can be fit into the framework of supply shocks and demand
responses. In particular, Franz-Gordon (1992) show that a change in labor’s share,
such as that implied by the real-wage rigidity hypothesis discussed in Part II, shifts the
inflation-unemployment relation in exactly the same way as a change in the relative
price of oil. The SP schedule shifts upward during the period when labor’s share is





the adjustment of expectations of inflation.
does not allow for a permanent increase in
unemployment, simply because the natural rate hypothesis is maintained and we have
not allowed for an increase in the natural rate of unemployment. This could occur
in two ways. First, the nature of the structural maladjustment could be to impair the
functioning of the labor market sufficiently to increase the natural rate. Second,
there could be a hysteresis mechanism in place which automatically translates aMacroeconomic Policy, Page 19
period of high actual unemployment into an increase in the natural rate of
unemployment.
Krugman (1994) asks whether generous European welfare policies, combined
with a relatively high reservation wage (or legal minimum wage) could explain the
rise in the natural unemployment rate in Europe. Such policies could explain high
unemployment
1970s and late
but not rising unemployment, as was observed between the early
1980s, unless the benefits had increased significantly. But European
welfare states were already generous back in the early 1970s when unemployment
was relatively low. Instead, he argues that the facts are consistent with a twist in the
demand for labor, combining a decrease in the demand for low-productivity workers
and an increase in the demand for high productivity workers. If reservation wages
do not change, or
decreased demand
unemployment rate
if there is a minimum wage that does not change, then the
for low-productivity workers will be translated into higher
than reduced relative wages. This hypothesis is consistent with
the facts that long-term unemployment of young people has increased significantly
in many European countries, while in the United States the same demand twist has
emerged in the form of an illcrease in the inequality of wage rates, In searching for
explanations of the demand twiw, Krugman rejects international competition from
low-wage countries, which he argues would change the sectoral mix of high skillMacroeconomic Policy, Page 20
relative to low skill employment. Instead, he favors the explanation that there has
been a generalized skill-biased shift in technology that has affected all industries.
Krugman places his emphasis on skill-biased technology shifts by comparing the
evolution of European and American labor markets. In contrast, Bean (1994) argues
that no one factor appears significant enough fully to explain the increase in
European unemployment and concludes that there must be multiple causes, rather
than a single cause. Gordon (1995), like Krugman, uses the differing performance
of the American and European economies as a criterion to assess
a long list of potential causes of a rising natural unemployment
the plausibility of
rate in Europe in
contrast to a stable (and recently declining) natural rate in the United States. He
centers his analysis on a standard labor market diagram in which, following Layard
et. al. (199 1), short-term equilibrium occurs at the intersection of a





bargaining process at alternative levels of labor input. What
caused the European wage-setting curve to shift upwards or the
U. S. wage-setting curve to shift downwards?
1. An increase in the tax wedge. Since firms pay pre-tax wages but workers
receive after-tax wages, any increase in payroll or income taxes can shift up the wage-
setting schedule. The tax wedge in the Europe is both
than in the United States between the late 1960s and late
higher and increased
1980s (Bean, 1994, p.
more
586).Macroeconomic Policy, Page 21
2. The rigid real wage hypothesis seems consistent with the observed bulge in
the European labor share between 1974 and 1982 (Figure 3 above), which coincides
with the period of most rapid increase in the natural rate of unemployment.
3. A leading candidate for causing divergent behavior across the Atlantic is the
marked decline in U. S. trade union membership, from 26.2 percent in 1977 to 15.8
percent in 1993 (union members as a fraction of wage and salary workers).
4. The real minimum wage has fallen sharply in the United States while rising
in some European countries, particularly France.
5. Both legal and illegal immigration of unskilled workers into the U. S. has
added substantially to the supply of unskilled labor and plausibly added to downward
pressure on the U. S. wage-setting schedule.
6. Product market r~:gulation in Europe, particularly German shop-closing
hours, reduce the demand fot unskilled labor as contrasted to the demand that would
emerge with an unregulated product market.
These six factors are complementary to Krugman’s skill-biased demand twist
and provide a convincing set of macroeconomic phenomena that can be summarized
by the phrase “structural maladjustment.” We will return below to the interactions
of structural maladjustment and reform with demand management policy and with
the evolution of productivi~] growth.Macroeconomic Policy, Page 22
3.3 The Hysteresis Hypthesis
The second approach to explaining a permanent rise in the natural rate of
unemployment is the hysteresis hypothesis.
hysteresis hypothesis is equivalent to replacing
the driving variable in the inflation equation
It can be shown formally that the
the level of the unemployment gap as
by the change of the unemployment
rate.G It contradicts the basic implication of the natural rate hypothesis that demand-
management policy cannot permanently alter the unemployment rate. Instead, it
revives the original Phillips tradeoff between inflation and unemployment. A
demand-induced recession boosts unemployment, which in turn boosts the natural
rate. Inflation stabilizes at a new
converges to the new higher actual
lower level when the new higher natural rate
unemployment rate. In reverse, the hypothesis
implies that demand-management policy always is faced with the choice of achieving
a reduction of unemployment at the cost of a finite, not ever-accelerating, increase
in the inflation rate. But, unlike the original stable Phillips tradeoff, the tradeoff
schedule available to policymakers at any given time depends on all of past history.
The experience of high unemployment implies that European policymakers cannot
push the unemployment rate as low as they could were they taking the same policy
actions as fifteen or twenty-five years ago.
6. Our diseuxion here refers to a “linear” version of the hysteresis hypothesis in which the equilibrium
unemployment rate “like an elephant” remembers all pastshocks. Cross (1995b, p. 190) distinguishes this from
the nonlinear version in which the memory of past shocks is selective.Macroeconomic Policy, Page 23
If hysteresis is present in fact, this calls for a theoretical explanation.’ The
insider-outsider model of wage determination shows how employed insiders are able
to convert a favorable demand or supply shock into wage increases for themselves
rather than into new jobs for the unemployed. The target real-wage bargaining
model goes in the same direction. In addition to total unemployment in the Phillips
curve approach, nominal wage increases are influenced in addition by the deviation
of real wages or of labor’s income share from target levels. If the target level of
labor’s share responds hysteresis-like to its actual level, then any pressure on wages
stemming from deviations of the actual share from the target share gradually
disappears.
Maladjustment and Hysteresis 3.4 Implications of Structural
How can the structural maladjustment and hysteresis hypotheses be interpreted
in the diagrammatic framework previously introduced? In Figure 12 we consider a
possibility that might have occurred in the 1970s and early 1980s, the conjunction
of a temporary adverse supply shock caused by higher oil prices and/or an increase
in labor’s income share, with a permanent increase in .the natural rate of
unemployment caused by Krugman’s labor demand twist toward more highly skilled
workers, together with some combination of my previous list of supply-side
7. A wide variety of theoretical and empirical papers on hysteresis is found in Cross (1988).Macroeconomic Policy, Page 24
impediments, including an increase in the real minimum wage and an increase in the
tax wedge. In Figure 12 the temporary shock is indicated by the upward shift in the
SP curve, and the permanent increase in the natural rate by the rightward shift in the
LP line.
What choices are open to policymakers? If the growth rate of nominal GDP
relative to potential output growth (x) remains unchanged, the economy initially
moves to point L, just as in Figure 11. Once the source of the supply shock is
removed (e.g., the relative price of oil or labor’s share stabilizes at a new level), in
Figure 11 inflation and unemployment returned to their original levels. But in Figure
12 there no longer is a positive unemployment gap at point L. Inflation is higher
than excess nominal GDP growth, and so output must grow more slowly than
potential output, and the unemployment rate must rise relative to the new higher
natural rate. The econom]~ goes through the disinflationary loop shown by the
dashed line in Figure 12, initially experiencing a further rise in unemployment
then a partial recovery to the equilibrium level UI*.
Both the structural m~ladjustment approach and the hysteresis approach
explain the observed increase in Europe’s natural rate of unemployment. Can they
be distinguished? One apprcach is to estimate wage and price equations to determine
the validity of the condition for “pure hysteresis,” namely the absence of a “level”
effect of the unemployment gap. In one such attempt, Franz and Gordon (1992)
and
canMacroeconomic Policy, Page 25
found that hysteresis was partial rather than full in
States, since both level and rate of change effects
both Ge~many and the United
are highly significant in both
countries. Because the German and U. S. coefficients are so similar, yet the evolution
of unemployment in the two countries is so different, there appears to be little
potential through this route for explaining that evolution. If hysteresis is partial (i.e.,
inflation depends on both the level and change of the unemployment gap), it provides
no explanation of a permanent increase in unemployment, since the equilibrium
properties of the economy are the same as with a straightforward natural rate model
in which inflation depends only on the level of the unemployment gap.
The structural maladjustment approach as depicted in Figure 12 has the appeal
of realism. Oil shocks, an increase in labor’s share, and a skill-biased demand twist,
all began to occur in the 1970s. By the time the oil shocks and the increase in labor’s
share had been reversed, the natural rate of unemployment had been increased by
aspects of the European welfare system that prevented the demand twist from being
translated into greater inequality
extent in the United Kingdom.
of wages, as it was in the United States and to someMacroeconomic Policy, Page 26
4. Intemctions between Macro Policy and Structura! Maladjus~ent
4.1 Responses of Demand Management to Successful Structural Reform
We can now discuss interactions between structural reform and macro demand-
management policy. If the sources of structural maladjustment are identified and
macroeconomic policy reform begins to reverse their effects, how should demand
management policy respond?s Our previous framework is easiest to interpret if, as
in Figure 13, we assume that successful structural reform instantaneously shifts the
~ line Ieftward. We have relabeled the points on the diagram, so that the
economy’s initial high level of the natural rate is at UO * and moves leftward suddenly
to U1 *. Because the unemployment gap is now zero at point .E1 there is a new SPI
schedule that has shifted to the left at the initial inflation rate and expected inflation
rate. However, the econom:r does not move instantly from point EOto El. Instead,
it moves to point A, which is at the intersection of the new SP1 line with the initial
DGO line, which holds fixed the initial rate of excess nominal GDP growth (x~. At
point A inflation has declined below the initial value of x, and this allows actual
output growth to rise above the rate of potential output growth. Successive periods
in which inflation remains below XO allow a temporary acceleration of output growth,
which in turn allows the actL,al unemployment rate to decline to the new equilibrium
point El. An alternative poiicy could achieve the same output path by temporarily
8. A detailed evaluation anti chronology of structural reform efforts is provided in OECD (1994 b).Macroeconomic Policy, Page 27
raising excess nominal GDP growth by enough to maintain
thus allowing the economy to move straight left from EOto
the curved dashed path drawn through point A.
a constant inflation rate,
El rather than following
How can such a policy procedure be carried out in practice? The U. S. Federal
Reserve Board appears to follow a policy procedure that could be interpreted as
targeting the unemployment rate consistent with steady nonaccelerating inflation, i.e.,
adjusting interest rates to keep the actual unemployment rate as close as possible to
the natural unemployment rate (U*). Since the Fed believes that the effects of its
immediate instrument, the Federal Funds rate, take roughly one year to influence the
unemployment rate, it leans toward raising the Federal Funds rate when its best
forecast of the actual unemployment rate one year from now is below its estimated
value of U*. Symmetrically, it leans toward reducing the Federal
its best forecast of the actual unemployment rate one year from
estimated value of U*.
Funds rate when
now is above its
Although U* may not move around as much as the actual unemployment rate,
but it is not immutably carved in stone as a single precise number. When inflation
turns out to be lower than the value forecast by the Fed’s staff or a consensus of
private forecasters, as in much of 1995, the Fed concludes that U* has declined from
the value previously assumed by forecasters. This makes it more likely that the Fed
will reduce interest rates and less likely that it will raise them. Accordingly, a lowMacroeconomic Policy, Page 28
realized value of inflation or a high realized value of unemployment can both lead
to lower long-term interest rates as speculators guess that the Fed’s next move will
be to reduce short-term interest rates.
The Fed appears to act as if it is operating in a closed economy environment,
and it does not appear to adjust its operation of this policy procedure in response to
movements of the exchange rate of the dollar. It would therefore appear that an
attempt by an individual central bank within Europe to emulate the Fed’s procedure
could lead to exchange rate fluctuations sufficiently large to compromise the
movement toward Monetary Union. A policymaker in Europe attempting to reduce
the actual unemployment rate in response to a lower natural unemployment rate
(achieved by a successful nlicroeconomic reform policy) would notice first that
inflation is turning out to be below forecast, and would react by reducing interest
rates to stimulate the dolnestic economy in order to push down the actual
unemployment rate. The c(:ntral aspect of this policy is taking the good news on
inflation to be a signal that stimulative policies should be adopted to reduce the
unemployment rate, rather than just “accommodating” the lower inflation rate by
maintaining the existing unemployment rate.
4.2 Structural Reform and l>roductlvity Growth
The analysis of Figurl: 13 did not take into account any effect of structural
reform on the growth rate of potential output, which would reduce x (the excess ofMacroeconomic Policy, Page 29
nominal GDP growth over potential output growth) if actual nominal GDP growth
were to remain unchanged. Uncertainty regarding the effect of structural reform on
potential output growth stems from the conflict between two forces. Pure efficiency
gains should raise productivity grotih. But reforms in labor markets that make labor
less expensive for employers to hire, such as the reduction or elimination of the
minimum wage, may raise the demand for labor at a given level of output and reduce
productivity. The same effect would be expected of particular product market
reforms, especially a loosening of German regulations on shop-closing hours that
would trade consumer convenience for an increase in the labor requirements needed
to achieve a given total of real retail sales.
The interactions between changes in the degree of structural maladjustment,
both in an adverse and beneficial direction, are explored in Gordon (1995 b). The
evolution of European unemployment is portrayed as resulting from a set of adverse
wage-setting shocks (e.g., an increase in the real effective minimum wage) which
initially raises unemployment and, by shifting the economy northwest up a labor
demand curve, also boosts the marginal and average products ‘of labor. This is then
followed by a profit squeeze and a period of disinvestment, which eliminates the
productivity gain but further increases the unemploymel]t rate. Reversing this process
by achieving a beneficial wage-setting shock (e.g., a reduction in the real effective
minimum wage) would initially reduce unemployment and both the marginal andMacroeconomic Policy, Page 30
average products of labor, This would then be followed by a profits boom and an
increase of investment, which would offset the initial productivity loss and further
reduce the unemployment rate.
Feedback from Macro Policy to Structural Reform and Vice Versa
The analysis of Figure 13 emphasizes the opportunity for macro policy to
respond to a reduction in the natural rate of unemployment achieved by structural
reform. A policy response that stabilizes inflation and responds to a reduction in the
natural rate as an opportunity to accelerate nominal demand growth differs from a
passive policy in which excess nominal GDP growth (x) is stabilized.
This policy choice may influence the likelihood and magnitude of structural
reform. When there is strong political opposition to such reform measures as
reducing the minimum wage and reducing government subsidies, the willingness of
central bankers and finance ministers to respond aggressively to successful reforms
may make those reforms more likely. There is potential for a political deal in which
the demand-management authorities promise to lean toward lower interest rates and
faster nominal demand growth, in trade for the willingness of political interest groups
to support those reform measures that appear to have the greatest chance of reducing
the natural unemployment rate. Demand expansion, by creating jobs, may also
reduce the transition costs of reform policies which create temporary unemployment
through the required restructuring of a particular industry that, for instance, has beenMacroeconomic Policy, Page 31
overstaffed as a result of previous state ownership and
airlines come to mind).
Another related feedback is from monetary policy
subsidies (the “olive-belt”
to fiscal policy. Demand
expansion which reduces the unemployment gap brings the actual government budget
deficit closer to the structural deficits displayed in Figure 5. A successful deal in
which demand expansion goes hand in hand with structural reform may succeed in
reducing the natural rate of unemployment and hence the structural deficits
themselves. Reducing the deficit then raises the potential for using the fiscal dividend
to reduce tax rates and hence the tax wedge, at least in those countries which are not
on an explosive track for the debt-GDP ratio.
There is feedback in the reverse direction as well. Countries with more
flexible labor markets may have a more favorable inflation-unemployment tradeoff,
i.e., a flatter SP schedule in Figures 10-13.
perspective of the hysteresis hypothesis,
This is particularly important from the
which implies that a reduction in
unemployment may be achieved at the cost of only a finite increase in the inflation
rate, the amount of which depends on the slope of the short-run tradeoff curve. The
United States, with its flexible labor market, has a very flat short-run tradeoff.
Current estimates show that a one-year sustained reduction of the actual
unemployment rate by one full percentage point below the natural unemploymentMacroeconomic Policy, Page 32
rate raises the inflation rate by only 0.35 of a percentage point after one year
(Gordon, 1995a, Table 1).
5. Policy Lessons fmm tie 1992-93 ERM Breakdown
An important controlled experiment was carried out in Europe in 1992-93 when
several important countries, particularly Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom, broke away from the ERM and achieved substantial depreciations
of their currencies against the countries which remained aligned with the Deutsche
mark, including France, the Low Countries, Austria, and Switzerland. Some
European analysts have previously believed that depreciation by any individual
country is futile, since any transitory output gains soon would be eroded by an
acceleration of inflation that will soon cause the competitive gains from the exchange
depreciation to evaporate. In its most extreme form, t:his view holds that countries
do not have any control, p:.st a transition period of a year or two, over their real
exchange rates.
A pessimistic interpr~:tation of the outcome of the 1992-93 divergence is
provided by some authors. I)eGrauwe (1995, p. 9) focusses on the two cases of Italy
and Spain. He points to tne temporary nature of the competitive gains. While
initially the sharp depreciations “did not affect inflation very much in these countries
(mainly because of the rece:;sion), since 1994 inflation differentials with GermanyMacroeconomic Policy, Page 33
have started to increase significantly.” He concludes that in order for Italy and Spain
to guide their inflation rates to the differential prescribed by the Maastricht Treaty,
a new policy of “painful disinflation” would have to begin. Since he views the
prospect of success of such policies as low, he thinks that ‘the door to monetary
union will be shut for a long time for these countries.”
DeGrauwe’s treatment is misleading, for numerous reasons. He focusses only
on two depreciating countries. He greatly exaggerates the acceleration of inflation
in those countries by comparing their inflation rates only with Germany, failing to
note that the German inflation rate was temporarily high in 1992-93 as a result of
the aftermath of the reunification boom. A more balanced appraisal would look at
a set of countries that depreciated and compare them with a set of countries other
than Gemny that did not depreciate. The omission of Germany is crucial, because
the time path of its disinflation in 1994-95 makes the inflation differential of any
other country with Germany a misleading indicator of the inflation differential of
that country with all countries other than Germany.
The results of the analysis are summarized in Table 2. The five appreciating
countries (not including Germany) are Austria, Belgium, France, Netherlands, and
Switzerland. On average these countries experienced a nominal-effective appreciation
of 10.2 percentage points, from exchange rate indexes of 99.5 in 1992:Q2 to 109.7
in 1995 :Q2. In contrast the depreciating countries —Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,Macroeconomic Policy, Page 34
and the United Kingdom —experienced an average depreciation of 22.2 points, from
an average index value of 99.1 in 1992:Q2 to 76.9 in 1995 :Q2. All of the average
values in Table 2 are weighted across the five countries in each group using Summers-
Heston 1985 PPP weights. Thus among the appreciating countries, the weight of
France is 59 percent. Among the depreciating countries, the respective weights of
Italy, Spain, and the U. K. are 36,2, 17.0, and 37,2 percent.
Both groups of countries enjoyed an acceleration of nominal GDP growth, a
deceleration of inflation, and thus an even greater acceleration
But there the similarity stops, The acceleration of nominal
of real GDP growth.
GDP growth in the
depreciating countries exceeded that in the appreciating countries by 1.3 percentage
points. Yet none of thiswasabsorbed by inflation; inflation actually decelerated more
in the depreciating countries than the appreciating countries..
acceleration of real GDP growth in the depreciating countries
depreciating countries by 1.7 percentage points.
And as a result
exceeded that in
It is implausible that this favorable outcome for the depreciating countries
the
the
could continue forever, but the IMF forecasts for 1996 (from the same source as used
for Table 2) show no acceleration of inflation to be predicted for the same average
of five depreciating countries. Thus it appears that the depreciating countries have
discovered a “macroeconomic free lunch,” an improvement in competitiveness and a
route to macroeconomic expansion without inflation. The implication is that thereMacroeconomic Policy, Page 35
is substantial room for individual nations in Europe to reduce their unemployment
gaps and their actual budget deficits through expansionary monetary policy. The
inevitable depreciation in the nominal exchange rate will translate into a durable
depreciation in the real exchange rate and an improvement in competitiveness.
With inflation in Germany at only 2 percent, some of which doubtless reflects
the well-known upward bias in price indexes, there is ample room for Germany to
lead the remaining nations tied to its exchange rate into a further expansion of
nominal GDP growth, The experience of the depreciating nations suggests that the
“split” of additional nominal GDP growth between output growth and inflation is
highly favorable under present conditions. Stated another way, the benign behavior
of inflation in Europe suggests that the natural rate of unemployment has begun to
decline, just as the Federal Reserve believes has occurred within the United States,Macroeconomic Policy, Page 36
6. Conclusion
The management of demand policy interacts with structural maladjustment,
both when maladjustment is getting worse, as in the 1970s and early 1980s, and
when successful structural reforms reduce the influence of structural maladjustment
and allow a decrease in the natural (i.e., constant-inflation) rate of unemployment.
In our interpretation a combination of structural factors, rather than a single “silver
bullet”, explains the substantial increase in Europe’s natural unemployment during the
decade 1975-85 and the divergence of that natural rate from the stationary or even
declining natural rate in the United States. In the 1970s two-supply shocks, in the
form of higher real oil prices and an increase in labor’s share in national income,
pushed European economies in the direction of higher inflation and higher
unemployment. Reactions of central banks varied, with monetary accommodation
in some countries —but not others —leading to a substantial divergence of inflation
rates in Europe by the early 1980s.
These two supply shocks, both of which were temporary and had their
influence reversed in the mid- 1980s, combined with more deeply entrenched
structural maladjustments to boost the European natural unemployment rate from
low single digits in the early 1970s to nearly 10 percent by 1985. While real oil
prices and labor’s income share declined subsequently, the natural rate did not. This
reflects the role of other longer-lasting maladjustments, especially inflexible realMacroeconomic Policy, Page 37
wages for the unskilled who were harmed by skill-biased technical change, and this
inflexibility in turn reflects three dimensions along which Europe (on average if not
for every country) differs from the United States – high and rising tax wedges, more
powerful unions, and a higher and (in some countries) rising real minimum wage.
This account does not place much emphasis on hysteresis. Empirical research
does not support the “pure hysteresis” view that requires the absence of level effects
of the unemployment gap in dynamic wage and price adjustment equations. The
most plausible channel by which hysteresis operated was through feedback from
other sources of maladjustment to low capital accumulation, with the result that




natural unemployment rate, Stated differently, Europe no longer has sufficient
capital to employ fully its existing labor force.
The paper stresses two-way interactions between structural reform and macro
policy. With flexible labor ]narkets, the short-run inflation-unemployment tradeoff
is likely to be favorable, providing an incentive for policymakers to expand aggregate
demand. The benign effect of the British depreciation in 1992 on the inflation rate
provides one example of the potential payoff of more flexible labor markets. In turn,
the promise by policymakers that they will encourage a decline in unemployment in
response to good news on inflation can be used to strike a political deal with political
interests opposed to the introduction or extension of structural reform. ExpansionaryMacroeconomic Policy, Page 38
monetary policy also provides relief on the fiscal front, both by reducing the
unemployment gap and bringing the actual budget deficit closer to the structural
budget deficit, but also, by encouraging structural reform, potentially reducing the
natural unemployment rate and therefore the structural budget deficit itself.
In 1992-93 several European countries dropped out of the ERM to pursue
.
more expansionary monetary policies. The difference in the performance of these
countries and those countries which maintained a peg between their currencies and
the Deutsche mark provides an important test case of the consequences of
expansionary monetary policy, Not surprisingly, the depreciating nations by 1995
enjoyed a substantial acceleration of nominal GDP growth relative to the nations that
did not depreciate. But, surprisingly, they enjoyed an even greater deceleration of
inflation, so that their growth rate of real GDP accelerated more than their growth
rate of nominal GDP.
This augurs well for a favorable outcome of expansionary demand policy. It
may be that the natural unemployment rate has begun to decline significantly in
Europe, and that this explains why inflation has continued to decelerate in countries
which have depreciated their exchange rates significantly. Job creation in those
countries creates an environment favorable to continued success in structural reform.
The set of issues addressed in this paper seems a long way from the depressing
litany of contractionary demand decisions currently being made in numerousMacroeconomic Policy, Page 39
European countries in the name of the Maastricht criteria. Some countries are on an
explosive path for the debt-GDP ratio and need to bring their fiscal house in order.
An important lesson can be drawn from the traditional textbook discussion of the
fiscal-monetary mix, that a shift toward tighter fiscal policy need not reduce output
or raise unemployment if accompanied by a shift toward easier monetary policy. A
shift toward a mix of tighter fiscal policy and easier monetary policy can occur in
two ways. First, the Bundesbank could adopt easier policies, allowing other countries
to expand while maintaining a fixed exchange rate with Germany.
Bundesbank does not adopt easier policies, other countries have
Second, if the
the option of
abandoning the path to monetary union and adopting expansionary monetary policies
that would bring down botl~ the actual and natural rates of unemployment with a
minimal acceleration of infhition.Macroeconomic Policy, Page 40
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Actual and Structural Deficit/GDP Ratios
Ratio Required to Stabilize Debt/GDP Ratio,
1995, Selected Countries
11.s. Fmnce 11.K. Camlsnv Snnin Sweden Ttslv -. -. - ------ -. .- . . . .... .. - --- ------- ..-. J
1. Debt-GDPRatio 46,0 51.5 52.5 58.8 64.8 81,4 124.9
2. WarrantedNominal
GDPGrowth 5.0 4.1 4.2 5.0 7.9 4.9 7,1
3. Stability Value of
Deficit/GDP Ratio 2.3 2.1 2.2 2.9 5.1 4.0 8.9
4. Actual Deficit 1.8 5.0 4.7 2.4 6.1 10.2 7.8
5. Actual Deficit
minus Stability Value -0.5 2.9 2.5 -0.5 1.0 6.2 -1.1
6. Structural Deficit 2,3 3.5 3.1 1.8 4.0 8.2 7.5
7. Structural Deficit
minus Stability Value 0.0 1.4 0.9 -1.1 1.1 4.2 -1.4
Soume by line: 1. Figure 6.
2. 1995 Potential Output growth from Giomo er. al. (1995), Table 2, plus 1995 rate of
change of GDP deflator, from IMF World Economic Outfook, October 1995, Table
A-9.
3. Line 1 times line 2, calculated as perunt.
4,6 Figure 5.Table 2
Change in Effective Exchange Rates, and Growth Rates
of Nominal GDP, Real GDP, and GDP Deflator, 1992-95,
Five Appreciating Countries and Five Depreciating Countries
Appreciating Depreciating Difference,
Countries Countries Depr - Apr
Effective Nominal
Exchange Rate
1992:Q2 99,5 99.1 -0.4
1995:Q2 109.7 76.9 -32.8
1995-1992 10.2 -22.2 -32.4
Percent Change in
Nominal GDP
1992 4.2 5.0 0.8
1995 4.6 6.7 2.1
1995-1992 0.4 1.7 1.3
Percent Change in
Real GDP
1992 1.7 0.2 -1.5
1995 2.7 2.9 0.2
1995-1992 1,0 2.7 1.7
Percent Change in
GDP Deflator
1992 2.5 4.8 2.3
1995 1.9 3.8 1.9
1995-1992 -0.6 -1.0 -0.4
Soume Notes: Appreciating countries are Austria, Belgium, France, Netherlands, Switzerland.
Depreciating muntries are Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
All data are aggregated using 1985Summers-Heston GDP weights.
Nominal and real GDP and GDP deflator growth rates are from IMF Wodd
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Figure 13